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ABSTRACT
Direct-to-consumer genetics makes it possible for everyone
to obtain their genome sequences. In order to contribute to
medical research, a growing number of people publish their
genomic data on the Web, sometimes under their real iden-
tity. However, this is at odds not only with their own privacy
but also with the privacy of their relatives. The genomes of
relatives being highly correlated, some family members might
be opposed to revealing any of the family’s genomic data. In
this paper, we study the trade-off between utility and privacy
in genomics. We focus on the most relevant kind of vari-
ants, namely single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). We
take into account the fact that the SNPs of an individual
contain information about the SNPs of his family members
and that SNPs are correlated with each other. Furthermore,
we consider that SNPs may have different significance for
medical research and different levels of sensitivity for indi-
viduals. We propose an obfuscation mechanism that enables
public availability of genomic data for research and, at the
same time, protects the genomic privacy of the individuals
in a family. Our genomic-privacy preserving mechanism re-
lies upon combinatorial optimization and graphical models
to optimize utility and meet privacy requirements. We also
present an extension of the optimization algorithm to cope
with non-linear constraints induced by the correlations be-
tween SNPs. Our results on real data show that the pro-
posed technique maximizes the utility for genomic research,
and satisfies family members’ privacy constraints.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—Security and protection (e.g., firewalls); J.3 [Life
and Medical Sciences]: Biology and genetics; K.4.1
[Computer and Society]: Public Policy Issues—Privacy
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Genomic Privacy; Obfuscation; Optimization
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1. INTRODUCTION
Genomic research has revolutionized our understanding
of medicine: the “one size fits all” approach has already
left its place to “personalized medicine” for the treatment
of many diseases, for which genetic factors of the individu-
als play an important role. This is also paving the way to
early diagnosis of many serious diseases. The association of
genetic factors with diseases and treatments is only possi-
ble via large-scale genome-wide association studies (GWAS)
that require the availability of a considerably high number of
human genomes. Computers are at the core of this endeavor,
because (i) high computing power is required to interpret ge-
nomic data [11], (ii) hand-held devices are used to visualize
this data, and (iii) more and more people tend to upload ge-
nomic data (and more generally health-related data) on pub-
lic websites (e.g, OpenSNP.org and personalgenomes.org).
Computing systems facilitate data access and processing for
legitimate usage, but sometimes also for purposes that were
initially unintended, thus raising privacy concerns.
Genomic data carries much sensitive information about
its owner. By analyzing the DNA of an individual, it is
now possible to learn about his disease predispositions (e.g.,
for Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s), ancestries, and physical at-
tributes [18]. The threat to genomic privacy is magnified by
the fact that a person’s genome is correlated to his fam-
ily members’ genomes, leading to interdependent privacy
risks. Kin genomic privacy was popularized by the story
of Henrietta Lacks whose cells were sequenced and DNA
put online without the consent of her descendants [1]. Af-
ter complaints from the family, essentially due to privacy
concerns, Henrietta’s genome was taken oﬄine, and in 2013,
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) came to an agree-
ment with the Lacks family that gave them some control
over her genome [2]. Even though this agreement enables
the genomic researchers to use Henrietta’s genome again, it
also draws attention to the lack of techniques for balancing
the benefits of genomic research with personal and kin ge-
nomic privacy risks. Richard Sharp, the director of biomedi-
cal ethics at the Mayo Clinic, warned that the agreement was
only a “one-off solution” rather than a broad policy that ad-
dresses the tension between research and relatives’ privacy,
and he added that a “new policy” was absolutely needed [2].
Anonymization was the first countermeasure proposed to
protect genomic privacy, but in many different studies it was
proven inadequate [25, 26, 43]. Another protection mecha-
nism is to add noise to aggregate statistical results (to satisfy
differential privacy) [19,30], at the cost of reduced accuracy.
The last option proposed in the literature is to rely on cryp-
tographic techniques [4, 6]. Even though these are proven
to be effective for using genomic data in healthcare [4, 12],
computational complexity becomes very high when it comes
to conducting statistical tests on large numbers of encrypted
genomes for genomic research [32].
In this work, we present a genomic-privacy preserving
mechanism (GPPM) to reconcile people’s willingness to
share their genomes (e.g. to help research1) with privacy.
Our GPPM acts at the individual data level, not at the ag-
gregate data (or statistical) level like in [19,30]. Focusing on
the most relevant type of variants (the SNPs), we study the
trade-off between the usefulness of disclosed SNPs (utility)
and genomic privacy. We consider an individual who wants
to share his genome, yet who is concerned about the sub-
sequent privacy risks for himself and his family. Thus, we
design a system that maximizes the disclosure utility while
not exceeding a certain level of privacy loss within a fam-
ily, considering (i) kin genomic privacy, (ii) personal privacy
preferences (of the family members), (iii) privacy sensitiv-
ities of the SNPs, (iv) correlations between SNPs, and (v)
research utility of the SNPs. Our GPPM can automatically
evaluate the privacy risks of all the family members and de-
cide which SNPs to disclose. To achieve this goal, it relies on
probabilistic graphical models and combinatorial optimiza-
tion. Our results indicate that, considering the current data
model, genomic privacy of an entire family can be protected
while revealing an appropriate subset of genomic data. Our
contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a GPPM for enabling genomic research
while protecting personal and kin genomic privacy.
• Considering the genomic data model, our obfuscation
mechanism maximizes the utility, and meets all the
privacy constraints of a given family.
• Using combinatorial optimization, we first compute
the optimal solution without considering correlations
between SNPs, and then we extend the algorithm to
deal with non-linear constraints induced by these cor-
relations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we provide a brief background on genomics, describe
the adversary model and present our genomic-privacy quan-
tification framework. In Section 3, we present our GPPM in
detail. Next, in Section 4, we evaluate its performance. In
Section 5, we summarize the related work, before discussing
the limitations and future work in Section 6.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce the revelant genomic
background, the adversary model and our quantification
framework for measuring genomic privacy.
2.1 Genomic Background
Genetic information is encoded on the DNA as a sequence
of nucleotides, represented by four letters A, T, G, and C.
For every two randomly selected individuals, approximately
99.9% of their DNA is similar, and the remainder is the ge-
netic variation. Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) is
the most common DNA variation in human population. A
1http://opensnp.wordpress.com/2011/11/17/first-results-
of-the-survey-on-sharing-genetic-information/
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Figure 1: Principle of human reproduction. Each
parent produces gametes that are derived from his
or her genome. The offspring’s genome is the com-
bination of these two gametes. As an example, the
circled SNP contains a homozygous-minor SNP (bb)
with major allele G and minor allele A.
SNP occurs when a nucleotide at a specific position on the
DNA varies between individuals of a given population. Al-
most all common SNPs have two different nucleotides (called
alleles): (i) the major allele is the most frequently observed
nucleotide, and (ii) the minor allele is the rare nucleotide.
From here on, we represent the major allele as B for a SNP
position, and the minor allele as b (both B and b are from
the set {A, T,G,C}).
The risk of an individual developing certain diseases can
be computed from his SNPs [31] (and from his clinical and
environmental factors). Hence, SNPs carry privacy-sensitive
information about individuals (and their family members).
In order to find the associations of the SNPs with the dis-
eases, genome-wide association studies (GWAS) are required
on a very large number of genomes.
For each SNP position, a child inherits one allele from
his mother and one from his father. Each allele of a par-
ent is inherited by a child with equal probability of 0.5. As
each SNP position contains two nucleotides (one inherited
from the mother and one from the father), the content of
a SNP position can be in one of the following states: (i)
BB (homozygous-major genotype), if an individual receives
the major allele from both parents; (ii) Bb (heterozygous
genotype), if he receives a different allele from each parent
(one minor and one major); or (iii) bb (homozygous-minor
genotype), if he inherits the same minor allele from both
parents. We illustrate a SNP with homozygous-minor geno-
type in Fig. 1 (on the offspring’s genome). In this example,
we illustrate a SNP (rs11200638 on the HTRA1 gene) that
increases the risk for macular degeneration (this disease is
the leading cause of blindness).2 This SNP (with major
allele G and minor allele A) increases the disease risk by
2.243 times, when it is in heterozygous form (i.e., (G,A), as
in the father and mother), and by 8.669 times when it is in
homozygous-minor form (i.e., (A,A), as in the offspring).3
In the same figure, we also illustrate how a child inherits his
SNPs from his parents.
We represent the content of a SNP position as xij for SNP
j at individual i, where xij ∈ {BB,Bb, bb}. For simplicity
of presentation, we denote BB as 0, Bb as 1, and bb as 2
(i.e., xij ∈ {0, 1, 2}). Furthermore, SNPs on the DNA have
2http://snpedia.com/index.php/Rs11200638
3Risk increase is with respect to the homozygous-major
genotype (G,G).
correlations with each other. Linkage disequilibrium (LD) is
a correlation that appears between pairs of SNP positions in
the whole genome, due to the population’s genetic history.
2.2 Adversary Model
The objective of the adversary is to infer the values of
hidden SNPs of one or more members of a given family.
To do so, he relies on some background knowledge, essen-
tially the minor allele frequencies (MAFs) of the SNPs, the
pairwise LD values between the SNPs, and the basic rules
of Mendelian inheritance. Note that LD values are only
expressed between pairs of SNPs by geneticists, thus only
pairwise correlations are available to the adversary. This
knowledge represents the genomic data model available to
the adversary. Second, the adversary observes a subset of
the SNPs of the family members, typically those who have
disclosed their genomic data (or part of them).
Thousands of genomes are already publicly available on
the Internet (e.g., 1000 Genomes Project, or OpenSNP).
Even though these genomes are generally anonymized, it
has been shown that an attacker can re-identify a genome’s
owner by (i) linking the owner’s demographics to publicly
available records such as voter lists [43], or (ii) searching
part of the owner’s DNA, such as his Y-chromosome4 or
her mtDNA5, in online databases (e.g., Ysearch or Family
Tree DNA) and linking DNA to last names [25]. Once the
genome’s owner is de-anonymized, the attacker can easily
rely on genealogy websites6 or online social networks (e.g.,
Facebook or 23andMe) in order to obtain the (partial) fam-
ily tree of the genome’s owner. As shown in Appendix A,
multiple owners from the same family can also be identified,
reinforcing the attacker’s inference power. Thus, in this pa-
per, we assume that the attacker has de-anonymized the
genome(s) owner(s) and knows (part of) the familial rela-
tionships.
The attacker’s ultimate goal is then formally defined
as computing posterior marginal probabilities of unknown
variables from the global posterior probability distribution
P (XH|XO,K), where XH represents the set of hidden SNPs,
XO the set of observed SNPs, and K the background knowl-
edge or data model. We show how this inference attack can
be efficiently carried out in the next subsection, and present
a real-world example in Appendix A. Note that this is cur-
rently the best known attribute-inference attack [27].
2.3 Genomic-Privacy Metrics
We briefly summarize our framework for quantifying kin
genomic privacy. In order to quantify the genomic privacy
of an individual, we mimic an attacker willing to infer some
targeted SNPs of a family member (or multiple family mem-
bers) of a targeted family. The resources of such an at-
tacker are the observed genomic data (of members of the
targeted family), the family tree, and public genomic knowl-
edge (background knowledge). We define F to be the set of
family members in the targeted family and S to be the set
of SNP IDs (i.e., positions on the DNA sequence), where
|F| = n and |S| = m. We also let xij be the value of SNP
j (j ∈ S) for individual i (i ∈ F), where xij ∈ {0, 1, 2} (as
introduced in Section 2.1). Furthermore, we let X be the
4Y-chromosome is directly passed from father to son.
5Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is directly passed from
mother to son or daughter.
6For instance, http://www.genealogy.com/.
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Figure 2: Factor graph representation of genomic
data (i.e. SNPs), familial relationships, and linkage
disequilibrium (LD) values between the SNPs.
set of SNPs of all family members, hence |X| = n ·m. Some
elements of X might be observed by the adversary (the ob-
served genomic data of one or more family members) and
others might be hidden. We denote the set of SNPs from X
whose values are hidden as XH, and the set of SNPs from
X whose values are observed by the adversary as XO.
The attacker carries out a reconstruction attack to infer
XH by relying on the background knowledge K (or data
model) and on his observation XO. To efficiently infer hid-
den SNPs, the attacker can make use of the belief propa-
gation algorithm [35, 38], a message-passing algorithm for
performing inference on graphical models. The belief prop-
agation algorithm can be run on a factor graph, a bipartite
graph containing two sets of nodes (corresponding to vari-
ables and factors) and edges connecting these two sets. In
this particular attack, the variable nodes on the factor graph
are the SNPs of the family members. Furthermore, there are
two types of factor nodes: (i) the familial factor nodes, rep-
resenting the familial relationships and reproduction rules,
and (ii) the LD factor nodes, representing the LD relation-
ships between the SNPs. Such a factor graph is illustrated
in Fig. 2 for a nuclear family. Message passing takes place
between the variable nodes and the factor nodes, possibly
during multiple iterations if the factor graph contains loops
(which is the case in our inference problem). The inference
algorithm converges when the marginal probabilities stabi-
lize. These probabilities are used by the attacker as the
inferred values of the targeted SNPs. Note that this algo-
rithm provides exact posterior probabilities when SNPs are
independent of each other (case without LD correlations)
and approximate probabilities, but in practice very accu-
rate, when SNPs are in LD with each other [27].
Once the targeted SNPs are inferred by the adversary,
genomic and health privacy of the family members are eval-
uated based on the adversary’s success and certainty about
the targeted SNPs and the diseases they reveal. We propose
two different metrics for quantifying genomic and health pri-
vacy: expected estimation error (incorrectness) and uncer-
tainty [27].
The inferred marginal probabilities can be expressed as
P (xˆij |XO,K), for all i ∈ F, j ∈ S. Incorrectness quanti-
fies the adversary’s error in inferring the targeted SNPs. In
other words, it quantifies the expected distance between the
adversary’s estimate on the value of a SNP, xˆij and the true
value of the corresponding SNP, xij . This expected estima-
tion error can be expressed as follows:
Eij =
∑
xˆij∈{0,1,2}
P (xˆij |XO,K)||xij − xˆij ||. (1)
Privacy can also be represented as the adversary’s uncer-
tainty [15, 40], that is the ambiguity of P (xˆij |XO,K). This
definition of uncertainty can be quantified as the (normal-
ized) entropy of P (xˆij |XO,K) as follows:
Hij =
−∑xˆij∈{0,1,2} P (xˆij |XO,K) logP (xˆij |XO,K)
log(3)
. (2)
We can also rely upon a similar metric, based on the mutual
information I(xij ; XO) = H(x
i
j)−H(xij |XO), that measures
the mutual independence between the targeted and the ob-
served data:
Iij = 1−
I(xij ; XO)
H(xij)
=
H(xij |XO)
H(xij)
. (3)
The above metrics are useful for quantifying the genomic
privacy of individuals. To quantify something more tangible,
these genomic-privacy metrics can be converted into health-
privacy metrics. To quantify an individual’s health privacy,
one can focus on the predisposition to different diseases. Let
Sd be the set of IDs of the SNPs that are associated with
a disease d. Then, a metrics quantifying the health privacy
for an individual i regarding the disease d can be defined as
follows:
Did =
1∑
k∈Sd ck
∑
k∈Sd
ckG
i
k, (4)
where Gik is the genomic privacy of a SNP k for individual
i, computed using (1) or (2), and ck is the contribution of
SNP k to disease d.
3. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In order to mitigate attribute-inference attacks and pro-
tect genomic and health privacy, the GPPM relies upon an
obfuscation mechanism. In practice, obfuscation can be im-
plemented by adding noise to the SNP values, by injecting
fake SNP values, by reducing precision, or by simply hiding
the SNP values. In this paper, we choose SNP hiding, essen-
tially because other options would not be tolerated by the ge-
nomic research community. Indeed, genetic researchers are
very reluctant to adding noise or fake data, notably because
of the huge investment they make to increase (sequencing)
accuracy. We assume one family member at a given time
willing to disclose his SNPs (e.g., for the research commu-
nity) while guaranteeing a minimum privacy level for him
and his family. Fig. 3 provides an overview of our genomic-
privacy preserving framework.
3.1 Settings
For clarity of presentation, we focus on one family, whose
members are defined by the set F (|F| = n). We assume
that there is only one donor D making a decision to share
his genome at a given time. His relatives might have already
publicly shared some of their genomic data on the Internet.
D takes this into account when he makes his own disclosure
decision. We let S (|S| = m) be the set of SNP IDs. Its
cardinality m can go up to 50 million, as this is currently the
approximate number of SNPs in the human population [3].
In practice, however, people put online (e.g., on OpenSNP)
up to 1 million most significant SNPs. We let XD = {xDj :
j ∈ S} represent the set of SNPs of D (xDj is the value of
SNP j of the donor D), that are all initially undisclosed,
i.e. XD ⊆ XH (where XH denotes the set of SNPs from X
whose values are hidden, as discussed before). Finally, we let
yD = {yDj : j ∈ S} represent the decision vector of D, where
yDj = 1 means the corresponding SNP will be disclosed, and
yDj = 0 means x
D
j will remain hidden. Note that the decision
of disclosing a SNP j could be probabilistic, transforming yDj
into a continuous variable in [0, 1]. We leave the study of
the continuous case for future work.
We express the privacy constraints of a family member
both in terms of genomic and health privacy. Our frame-
work can account for different privacy preferences for differ-
ent family members, SNPs, and diseases. In practice, we can
set the privacy sensitivities sij ’s of all SNPs to be equal by
default. Then, an individual willing to personalize his pri-
vacy preferences may further define his own privacy sensitiv-
ities regarding specific SNPs based on his privacy concerns
regarding, e.g., certain phenotypes. The most well-known
example of such a scenario is the case of James Watson,
co-discoverer of DNA, who made his whole DNA sequence
publicly available, with the exception of one gene known
as Apolipoprotein E (ApoE), one of the strongest predic-
tors for the development of Alzheimer’s disease.7 We let the
sets Pis and P
i
d include the privacy-sensitive SNP IDs and
privacy-sensitive diseases of individual i, respectively. We
represent the tolerance to genomic-privacy loss of individual
i as Pri(i,Pis), and the tolerance the health-privacy loss of
individual i regarding disease d ∈ Pid as Pri(i, d). These tol-
erance values represent the maximum privacy loss (after the
disclosure of D’s SNPs) that an individual would bear. By
considering the privacy losses instead of the absolute privacy
levels, we ensure that the donor will more likely reveal a SNP
whose value is already well inferred by the attacker before
donor’s disclosure (e.g., by using SNPs previously shared by
the donor’s relatives). Note that these tolerance values can
always be updated for any new family member willing to
disclose his genome. Finally, the utility function is a non-
decreasing function of the norm of yD as the knowledge of
more SNPs can only help genomic research. As a first step
towards enhanced genomic privacy, we assume linear contri-
bution of SNPs on utility.8 Formally, we define uj to be the
utility provided by SNP j to genomic research. Note that,
in practice, the utility of the SNPs can be determined by
the (trusted) research authorities and can vary based on the
type of study.
3.2 Linear Optimization
3.2.1 Optimization Problem
The donor is facing an optimization problem: maximizing
research utility while protecting his own and his relatives’
genomic and health privacy. First, the objective function is
formally defined as
∑
j∈S ujy
D
j . Then, privacy constraints
are defined, for each individual, as the sum of privacy losses
induced by the donor’s disclosure over all SNPs. This sum
7Later researchers have used correlations in the genome to
unveil Watson’s predisposition to Alzheimer’s [37]. In this
work, we also consider such correlations.
8We intend to study non-linear utility functions in future
work.
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Figure 3: General protection framework. The GPPM takes as inputs (i) the privacy levels of all family
members, (ii) the genome of the donor, (iii) the privacy preferences of the family members, and (iv) the
research utility. First, LD is not considered in order to use combinatorial optimization (see Subsection 3.2).
Note that we go only once through this box. Then, LD is used and a fine-tuning algorithm is used to cope
with non-linear constraints. See Subsection 3.3 for details on the end criterion. The algorithm outputs the
set of SNPs that the donor can disclose.
must be capped by the respective privacy loss tolerances of
all family members. Formally, for all individuals i ∈ F and
SNPs j ∈ S, the privacy loss induced by the disclosure of xDj
is defined as (Eij(y
D
j = 0) − Eij(yDj = 1)).9 Note here that
the privacy loss at a given SNP j for any relative is only
affected by the donor’s decision yDj regarding SNP j but
no other SNP k 6= j, meaning that LD correlations are not
taken into account. We make this assumption here in order
to define linear constraints. We show how to extend the
linear optimization problem to encompass LD correlations
in Subsection 3.3. Finally, note that if an individual i has
already revealed his SNP j, i.e. xij ∈ XO, the privacy loss
at this SNP for i is zero, because Eij(y
D
j = 0) = E
i
j(y
D
j =
1) = 0.
For all i ∈ F and SNP j ∈ S, the privacy weight pij is
defined as
pij = s
i
j × (Eij(yDj = 0)− Eij(yDj = 1)), (5)
where sij is the privacy sensitivity of individual i regarding
SNP j. Clearly, pij at a given SNP j can be different for
each family member, depending on how close he is from the
donor in the family tree, on the actual values xij and x
D
j of
his and the donor’s SNPs, and on his sensitivity. Note that
sij = 0 ∀j /∈ Pis.
We can now define the donor’s linear optimization prob-
lem as:
maximize
yD
∑
j∈S
ujy
D
j
subject to
∑
j∈Pis
pijy
D
j ≤ Pri(i,Pis),∀i ∈ F
∑
k∈Sd
piky
D
k ≤ Pri(i, d), ∀d ∈ Pid,∀i ∈ F
yDj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ S,
(6)
9Even though we use the expected estimation error Eij as the
privacy metrics here, other metrics, such as Hij (discussed
in Subsection 2.3), could also be relied upon.
where Sd is the set of SNPs that are associated with disease
d. Note that, for the last inequality, we replace the sensi-
tivity sik in p
i
k by the contribution ck of SNP k to disease
d described in (4), and we embed the normalization factor∑
k ck of (4) in Pri(i, d).
3.2.2 Optimization Algorithm
Our optimization problem is very similar to the multidi-
mensional knapsack problem [33] discussed in Appendix B.
We decide to follow the branch-and-bound method proposed
by Shih [41] because it finds the optimal solution, represents
a good trade-off between time and storage space, and al-
lows for the extension of the algorithm to null and negative
(privacy) weights. A branch-and-bound algorithm is a sys-
tematic enumeration of all candidate solutions, where large
subsets of candidate solutions are pruned by using upper
bounds on the quantity being optimized. A branch-and-
bound method generally relies on two main rules: (i) the es-
timation of the upper bound at any node (state of assigned
variables) in the search tree, and (ii) a choice criterion for
the selection of a branching variable at the node selected for
further partitioning.
In order to find (i), Shih suggests to treat the C-constraint
knapsack problem as C single-constraint knapsack problems
with the same objective function, and then compute the
value associated to the optimal fractional solution (thus re-
laxing yDj ∈ {0, 1} into yDj ∈ [0, 1]) of all of these C prob-
lems separately. The fractional optimal solution is easier
to solve than the integer solution, as it allows us to sort the
items (SNPs) with respect to their ratios between utility and
privacy weights rij = uj/p
i
j , from the highest to the lowest
ratios, and then to select all the highest ones that can fit un-
der the constraint, with the last SNP to fit partially included
(based on the remaining room). Note that, in our setting,
one can have different orderings of SNPs for different con-
straints, based on the pij values of the family members. The
computation of the fractional optimal solution is repeated
C times, for the C different optimization problems, leading
to C optimal values. Then, the upper bound at the given
node is defined as the minimum among all these C values.
The node selected for next branching is defined as the
one in the search frontier whose upper bound is the highest
among all nodes in the frontier, and where the solution as-
sociated with this upper bound is infeasible (some variables
being different than 0 and 1, or some constraints being not
satisfied). The branching variable is the one whose ratio is
the smallest among all the non-zero free variables (variables
not explicitly assigned to 0 or 1 at a node) in this infea-
sible solution. If the solution at this node happens to be
feasible (all decision variables being assigned to 0 or 1 and
all constraints being satisfied), then it is optimal, and the
algorithm stops.
Let us mention that our optimization problem has two
main differences with the multidimensional knapsack prob-
lem. First, the privacy metrics, hence weights, are expressed
in real values between 0 and 2 for Eij , whereas the knapsack
problem assumes integer numbers only. In order to obtain
integer values, we merely multiply all our privacy weights
pij ’s and tolerance values Pri(.) by 10
k, where k ∈ N+ de-
pends on the precision we want to attain, and then round
the weights to the closest greater integer and the tolerance
values to the closest smaller integer. This ensures that all
privacy constraints in the space of real numbers are still sat-
isfied. Second, the privacy weight pij can be equal to zero
(e.g., if xij ∈ XO) or even negative (when the donor reveals
a SNP whose value increases the privacy of his relative(s)
at the same SNP).10 Thus, the ratios rij might not be de-
fined or be negative. In order to resolve this issue, we give
a higher ranking in the ordering of SNPs to ratios with null
weights with respect to those with positive weights, and we
give even a higher ranking to those with negative weights.
We furthermore give higher ranking to negative weights with
absolute values higher than others. To enforce this ranking
in practice in Section 4, we set rij = uj/0.1 for null p
i
j ’s, and
rij = uj |pij |/0.01 for negative pij ’s. Note that, due to the re-
quirement of integer values for weights, all other (positive)
weights pij belong, after the aforementioned multiplication
by 10k and rounding, to N+.
The output of the above optimization algorithm is an op-
timal solution y∗D that represents the set of SNPs the donor
could disclose and an optimal value u∗ representing the max-
imum research utility. We represent the set of the optimal
candidate SNPs to be shared as X˜D ⊆ XD. This is the
output we see in state 2 of Fig. 4. We give X˜D as input
to the non-linear algorithm described in Subsection 3.3 to
eventually reach state 3.
3.3 Non-Linear Extension
3.3.1 Non-Linear Optimization Problem
The LD correlations between the SNPs are not consid-
ered in the above optimization problem in order for the con-
straints to remain linear. In this subsection, we propose
an extension of the branch-and-bound algorithm in order to
deal with non-linear constraints.
10For example, assume a child to be homozygous-major at
a given SNP and his father to be heterozygous. Then, the
estimation error for the child’s SNP, thus the privacy of the
child for this SNP, increases when the father’s SNP is ob-
served by the attacker (compared to the case when it is un-
known, when only the MAF is used, and this MAF is close
to 0).
Whereas in the case without LD, the privacy loss at a
given SNP j of individual i depended only on the donor’s
decision yDj regarding SNP j, we have here to consider all
the SNPs in LD with j to evaluate the privacy loss at j.
Defining E˜ij to be the privacy level of individual i at SNP
j quantified by including LD correlations, the privacy loss
at SNP j of individual i induced by the disclosure of X˜D
is equal to (E˜ij(y
D = 0) − E˜ij(y∗D)). This leads to the
following updated privacy weights
p˜ij = s
i
j × (E˜ij(yD = 0)− E˜ij(y∗D)). (7)
Note that now the argument of E˜ij is the entire vector y
D
and not only yDj , because of LD. The optimization problem
in (6) is reformulated as a non-linear optimization problem:
maximize
yD
∑
j∈S
ujy
D
j
subject to
∑
j∈Pis
p˜ij(y
D) ≤ Pri(i,Pis), ∀i ∈ F
∑
k∈Sd
p˜ik(y
D) ≤ Pri(i, d), ∀d ∈ Pid,∀i ∈ F
yDj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ S.
(8)
Instead of solving this very complex optimization prob-
lem, we rely on the optimal solution y∗D computed in Sub-
section 3.2, embed it into (8), and check whether the privacy
constraints are still met with the updated privacy weights
p˜ij ’s. Let us first study the case when no SNP has been
disclosed by any relative before the donor’s decision.11 If
XO = ∅, then∑
j∈Pis
E˜ij(y
D = 0) =
∑
j∈Pis
Eij(y
D = 0) (9)
and, because of LD correlations,∑
j∈Pis
E˜ij(y
∗D) ≤
∑
j∈Pis
Eij(y
∗D). (10)
Embedding (9) and (10) in (5) and (7), we get∑
j∈Pis
p˜ij(y
∗D) ≥
∑
j∈Pis
pijy
D
j , (11)
meaning that, for the same value of Pri(i,Pis) in (6) and
(8), the privacy constraint of family member i in (8) will be
violated with high likelihood once LD is taken into account.
If XO 6= ∅, then two scenarios can happen. If∑
j∈Pis
Eij(y
∗D)− E˜ij(y∗D)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Privacy difference using LD or not
when X˜D⊂XO
≥
∑
j∈Pis
Eij(y
D = 0)− E˜ij(yD = 0)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Privacy difference using LD or not
when X˜D⊂XH
,
then we get the same inequality (11), leading to the same
consequences of constraint violation. If , on the contrary,∑
j∈Pis
Eij(y
∗D)− E˜ij(y∗D) <
∑
j∈Pis
Eij(y
D = 0)− E˜ij(yD = 0),
(12)
11Without loss of generality, we focus here on the genomic-
privacy constraints.
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Figure 4: Main steps of the optimization algorithm. Without loss of generality, the donor D is assumed to be
the n-th member of the family, thus XD = Xn. First, the donor selects a subset X˜D of candidate SNPs to be
shared using the optimization algorithm of Subsection 3.2.2, and then reveals less or more SNPs depending
on the updated privacy weights computed with LD by relying upon the fine-tuning step of Subsection 3.3.
then we get ∑
j∈Pis
p˜ij(y
∗D) <
∑
j∈Pis
pijy
D
j , (13)
which might allow the donor to reveal more of his SNPs with-
out violating any of his relatives’ privacy constraints. At a
first glance, Inequality (13) looks counterintuitive. How-
ever, in order to understand it, let us look at Inequality
(12), which states that the difference in privacy levels if
LD is used or not is smaller after the observation of the
donor’s SNPs X˜D. This means that, by revealing his own
SNPs, the donor reduces the importance of using LD corre-
lations to correctly infer some of the SNPs of his relatives.
For instance, let us assume the donor to be the father of
a child i whose mother has already revealed SNP j, in LD
with another SNP k revealed by the child. Furthermore,
assume that the father, mother and child are homozygous
major at SNPs j and k. Now, before the father reveals
his SNP j, there is some uncertainty on the child’s SNP
j, but observing SNP k of the child, the attacker improves
his estimation if he uses LD correlations and thus reduces
his estimation error, meaning E˜ij(y
D = 0) < Eij(y
D = 0).
However, once the father decides to reveal his homozygous
major SNP j (y∗Dj = 1), the attacker is certain that the
child’s SNP j is homozygous major, no matter if LD is
used or not, i.e. Eij(y
∗D) = E˜ij(y
∗D) = 0. Thus, we have
Eij(y
∗D) − E˜ij(y∗D) < Eij(yD = 0) − E˜ij(yD = 0), leading
by extension to Inequality (12).
3.3.2 Fine-Tuning Algorithm
Let us first describe how we proceed if one or multiple
constraints are violated once LD correlations are considered
in the privacy quantification. In this case, we first select the
privacy constraint that is not met anymore with the high-
est difference between Pri(i,Pis) (or Pri(i, d)) and the newly
computed privacy losses. Focusing on the set of genomic-
privacy constraints, we thus select the constraint of the fam-
ily member k, where
k = arg max
i∈F
{
∑
j∈Pis
p˜ij(y
∗D)− Pri(i,Pis)}. (14)
We want then to hide some SNPs j in X˜D (i.e. where y∗Dj =
1) in order that the constraint of relative k is satisfied again.
For all the SNPs in X˜D, we compute a global privacy weight
δkj for SNP j of k that includes the privacy loss induced by
SNP j on the SNPs l ∈ L in LD with j. We compute this
global privacy weight at SNP j for individual k as
δkj = p˜
k
j +
∑
l∈L
p˜kl
= skj (E˜
k
j (y
D=0)− E˜kj (y∗D))+
∑
l∈L
skl (E˜
k
l (y
D=0)− E˜kl (y∗D)).
(15)
Then, we compute the ratios of each SNP j (in X˜D) for in-
dividual k as r¯kj = δ
k
j /uj . The SNPs with the highest ratios
represent those where LD correlations cause the highest de-
crease in the genomic privacy of family member k and/or
provide low utility to the optimal solution y∗D computed in
Subsection 3.2. Thus, such SNPs should be removed first
from the set X˜D in order to meet the privacy constraint of
individual k again, while causing the smallest decrease in
utility.
We iteratively remove such SNPs (starting from the one
with the highest ratio) from the set X˜D and, after each
removal, we input the new solution to the quantification box
to see whether the privacy constraint is met for the family
member k. We repeat this until all the privacy constraints
are again satisfied for all family members in F. Finally, the
SNPs left in set X˜D after the final iteration are publicly
shared. This case is illustrated in state 3 of Fig. 4.
In the case where considering LD correlations in the pri-
vacy quantification actually decreases privacy losses, the pri-
vacy constraints are still met and can even allow for poten-
tial new SNPs to be included in X˜D. In this case, we select
the genomic-privacy constraint where the remaining room
between the genomic-privacy constraint and the newly com-
puted privacy loss is the smallest, i.e. we select the con-
straint of the family member k, where
k = arg min
i∈F
{Pri(i,Pis)−
∑
j∈Pis
p˜ij(y
∗D)}. (16)
For all SNPs not in X˜D (i.e., where y∗Dj = 0), we compute
the privacy decrease led by LD for k compared to the pri-
vacy level computed without LD. We compute this privacy
difference at a SNP j for individual k as
∆kj = E
k
j (y
∗D
j = 0)− E˜kj (y∗D), (17)
where Ekj (y
∗D
j = 0) is the privacy value at SNP j for indi-
vidual k after the linear optimization (without considering
LD), and E˜kj (y
∗D) is the privacy quantified using LD. Then,
we compute the ratios of each SNP j (in X˜D) for individual
k as r¯kj = (uj∆
k
j )/s
k
j . The SNPs with highest ratios rep-
resent those where LD correlations cause highest decrease
in the genomic privacy of family member k, and/or provide
high utility. Thus, these SNPs are the first ones that should
be included in X˜D, in order to have the smallest difference
in privacy loss, thus still meeting k’s privacy constraint and
providing maximal utility increase.
We iteratively add SNPs in X˜D and input the new so-
lution to the quantification box to check whether all the
privacy constraints are still met for all family members. We
repeat this step until one privacy constraint is violated again,
and we publicly share the last set X˜D that satisfied all con-
straints. In the next section, we briefly show experimen-
tally how close this fine-tuning algorithm is to the maximum
found with exhaustive search. The thorough analytical eval-
uation of the discrepancy between the optimal solution and
our approximation is left for future work.
4. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our op-
timization algorithm to protect individual and kin privacy.
We study the balance between maximum achievable utility
and the privacy of each individual in a family. The results
show the total utility we can obtain for different genomic-
privacy guarantees.
We make use of the CEPH/Utah Pedigree 1463 [16]. It
includes the partial DNA sequences of 17 family members:
4 grandparents, 2 parents, and 11 children. In order to re-
main at a representative scale, we only keep 5 randomly
chosen children out of 11. Fig. 5(a) presents the pedigree
structure that we use in our study. We focus on 50 SNPs of
chromosome 1 and assume one genomic-privacy constraint,
including all the 50 SNPs for each family member. Thus, we
have a total of 11 privacy constraints, which represents more
constraints than other generic experiments in the optimiza-
tion literature that included up to 5 or 7 constraints [20].
Considering LD strengths between r2 = 0.5 (medium LD)
and r2 = 1 (strongest LD), each SNP is in LD with around
4.5 other SNPs, on average. We set a precision of 0.01 in
our privacy weights and tolerance values, thus multiplying
these real-valued elements by 102, and rounding them, as
explained in Subsection 3.2. Parent P5 is assumed to be
the donor in all scenarios presented in this section. In our
evaluations, for the sake of simplicity, we assume each SNP
is equally useful for the genomic research, i.e., uj = 1 for all
SNPs. We also assume the privacy sensitivities are equal,
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Figure 5: Evaluation of the proposed solution on a
real Utah pedigree. (a) Genealogical tree, (b) Util-
ity versus privacy under low tolerance to privacy
loss for all relatives except parent P5, and vary-
ing values of privacy constraints Pri(5,P5s ) for parent
P5 (x-axis). Here, XO = ∅, meaning that no rel-
ative has revealed any SNP before P5. Low toler-
ance is defined as 1/4 of the total privacy loss that
a relative would incur if all 50 SNPs of P5 were
revealed. Results are shown up to Pri(5,P5s ) = 4.4
even if P5’s privacy constraint can go beyond be-
cause, from Pri(5,P5s ) = 4, the utility stops increasing
(capped by other relatives’ restrictive privacy con-
straints). The granularity of the x-axis is set to 0.4
in order to have 12 tolerance scenarios in total.
for all SNPs and individuals, i.e., sij = s. Equal values of
sensitivities for all SNPs would typically be the default set-
ting, if e.g. family members do not want to bother setting
their privacy sensitivities themselves. Other distributions
over the utility or sensitivity values should not alter the
algorithm’s performances significantly. In fact, non-uniform
distributions would even certainly improve its performances,
because of the crucial role of orderings in the branch-and-
bound method.
4.1 No Previous Disclosure by the Family
As most people have not publicly revealed their genome
for the moment, we first analyze the case where no fam-
ily member has shared any of his SNPs before the donor
makes his decision. In other words, we assume that, ini-
tially, XO = ∅. We analyze the tension between utility
and privacy for different values of parent P5’s privacy con-
straint. Fig. 5(b) shows the increase in the utility caused by
the higher privacy loss tolerance of P5. Because a low toler-
ance to privacy loss is assumed for all the other relatives in
the family in this case, the utility (computed without LD)
cannot go beyond 19, even if P5’s constraint increases be-
yond 4. We also notice that, once the LD is included into
the privacy quantification, the utility decreases, reaching a
maximum value of 13 instead of 19. This is due to the fact
that LD increases the privacy loss incurred when P5 reveals
his SNPs, thus reducing the total number of SNPs parent P5
can reveal without violating the family’s privacy constraints.
4.2 Previous Disclosure by Part of the Family
We want to mimic the situation that some of the family
members have already revealed some of their SNPs. We
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Figure 6: Utility versus privacy under (a) medium,
(b) high tolerance to privacy loss for all relatives ex-
cept parent P5, and varying values of privacy con-
straints for parent P5 (x-axis). Medium, respec-
tively high, tolerance is defined as around half, re-
spectively 3/4, of the total privacy loss that a rela-
tive would incur if all 50 SNPs of P5 were revealed.
The x-axis represents the privacy loss constraint of
P5, that has been split into 12 different cases, from
0 privacy loss (strongest constraint) to 9.9 privacy
loss (i.e., around 0.2 privacy loss per SNP, which is
a weak constraint).
simulate this by randomly selecting (with probability 0.5)
some of the family members (except P5, who is the donor)
who reveal a subset of their SNPs. Then, for the members
who are selected to reveal their SNPs, we select, uniformly
at random, some of their 50 SNPs to reveal. In the scenario
we focus on, this leads to the following SNPs being revealed
before the donor’s decision: 8 (different) SNPs revealed by
both GP1 and GP2; 35 SNPs revealed by GP3; 42 revealed
by GP4; 0 by P6; 0 SNP revealed by C7, C8, C9, C10; and
30 by C11.
We analyze the relation between utility and privacy for
different genomic-privacy constraint values, for each of the
eleven individuals, Pri(i,Pis). Fig. 6(a) and 6(b) illustrate
the utility gain with respect to different privacy loss toler-
ance levels for the donor (P5). The two figures differ es-
sentially in terms of the genomic-privacy constraints of the
rest of the family members. In Fig. 6(a), the tolerance is
medium; more precisely, the privacy constraint for each in-
dividual in the pedigree (except P5) is set to half of the
maximum privacy loss that would be incurred by that indi-
vidual if the donor revealed all his SNPs. In Fig. 6(a), the
tolerance is higher, set to 3/4 of the maximum privacy loss.
We first focus on the utility computed using our branch-
and-bound algorithm (case without LD). In Fig. 6(a), we
observe that the utility does not increase beyond 38 when
we increase the genomic-privacy loss constraint of the donor
more than 5.4. From this point, the increased privacy toler-
ance of the donor does not enable him to reveal more SNPs,
because he is constrained by the rest of the family’s privacy
requirements. In Fig. 6(b), we note that the utility keeps in-
creasing with the privacy loss constraint of P5 because the
other family members are more tolerant regarding their own
privacy loss.
Looking at the utility induced once we include the LD
correlations in the privacy quantification, we notice some
increase in the utility. In other words, including LD enables
the donor to reveal more SNPs than without LD. Utility in
both curves reaches 50 SNPs after a 4.5 privacy loss con-
straint for the donor. This can be explained by the fact
that, when LD is considered, we use Equation (7) (privacy
loss with LD) instead of Equation (5) (privacy loss without
LD) to compute the privacy weights for each SNP in each
constraint. And the privacy loss in Equation (7) is actually
smaller than in Equation (5) in this scenario, essentially be-
cause LD already decreases significantly the relatives’ pri-
vacy before the donor reveals any of his own SNPs. This
is very visible in Fig. 7(a) and 7(b). In Fig. 7(a), we show
the privacy levels for any family member when LD is not
included in the privacy quantification. Fig. 7(b) shows the
privacy levels when LD correlations are also used in the pri-
vacy quantification.
First, we notice that in both figures, it is P5’s privacy
level that decreases the most, as he is the one who actually
reveals new SNPs in the process. Other relatives’ privacy
is only damaged due to familial correlations. At the origin
of the x-axis (i.e., on the y-axis), we see the privacy levels
before the donor makes a decision, i.e., before the optimiza-
tion algorithm. We notice that, here again, privacy without
LD is much higher than privacy once LD is used to infer the
SNPs. This is because some relatives have already revealed
part of their genomic data. This is the reason why, once
P5 reveals his own SNPs, the privacy loss is much smaller
in Fig. 7(b) than in Fig. 7(a). As a consequence, the donor
(P5) can reveal more SNPs while still meeting his family’s
privacy constraints, thus leading to the utility increase dis-
played in Fig. 6(a) and 6(b). We conclude that the values of
the privacy-loss constraints have to be carefully determined
by the family members or the genetic counsellors, based on
family members’ privacy expectations and on whether LD is
included or not in the initial inference and privacy quantifi-
cation. In our case, in order to make use of the linear opti-
mization framework, we defined the privacy loss constraints
based on the privacy levels computed without LD.
Finally, we compared the optimal solutions computed with
exhaustive search over a subset of 10 SNPs whose privacy
weights were computed with LD, with the solutions derived
from our optimization algorithm presented in Fig. 4. In the
various scenarios we tested, the exhaustive search method
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Figure 7: Genomic privacy of all family members given the genomic-privacy constraint of P5, under the same
setting as in Fig. 6(a) i.e. under medium privacy loss constraints for P5 relatives: (a) privacy computed
without LD, and (b) privacy computed with LD, before the fine-tuning phase. We do not show the privacy
levels of GP3, GP4 and P6 as these remain constant. Note the large discrepancy in absolute privacy values
and privacy losses between Fig. 7(a) and 7(b). Also notice that GP1 privacy curve is hidden by GP2 privacy
curve in Fig. 7(a) (they have same privacy levels w/o LD).
could never find higher utility values than our fine-tuning al-
gorithm. In all scenarios, our fine-tuning algorithm reached
the maximum utility. Thus, even though we do not have
any formal demonstration that the fine-tuning step is opti-
mal, we are confident that it provides in general a very good
approximation of the optimum.
4.3 Computational Complexity
As expected, the highest computation time was on average
induced by the branch-and-bound algorithm (Subsec. 3.2),
due to the high complexity of the multidimensional knapsack
problem. The non-linear extension (Subsec. 3.3) is by design
very efficient as it relies on previous optimal computations,
and it updates a minimal set of decision variables, trading-
off exact optimality for computational efficiency. This last
part only requires to quantify privacy levels twice at the
beginning (in the quantification box), to get the E˜ij(y
D =
0)’s and E˜ij(y
∗D)’s, and then quantify once per update on
a decision variable y∗Dj .
12
As discussed in Appendix B, the multidimensional knap-
sack problem (with at least two constraints) is NP-complete
and admits no fully polynomial-time approximation scheme.
From our experiments, we notice that the complexity of the
branch-and-bound algorithm highly differs for different set-
tings, e.g., different privacy-loss tolerance values or privacy
weights. With 50 SNPs, the vast majority of the solutions
were found in less than one second. However, the algorithm
did not scale well for more than 50 decision variables. The
positive side is that this whole process has to be undertaken
only once by the donor and can be run oﬄine. Furthermore,
we considered one privacy constraint for each family mem-
ber, thus eleven constraints in total. In practice, some rela-
tives would certainly not care much about their genomic pri-
12Note that the computational complexity of one quantifica-
tion step is O(nm) [27].
vacy, and thus some constraints could be relaxed, enabling
us to consider more SNPs in the optimization problem. Also,
an advantage of the branch-and-bound algorithm is that it
can be run in parallel and distributed using a computer clus-
ter. The algorithm’s running time then scales linearly with
the number of machines and cores [9]. Another way to re-
duce the complexity is to cluster subsets of SNPs together
(based on the diseases they are associated with, or based
on the LD correlations between them), thus trading-off the
granularity of the obfuscation mechanism for computational
efficiency. Note that our optimization problem can easily be
adapted to deal with clusters of SNPs: we can simply define
the privacy weight of one cluster as the sum of the privacy
losses over the SNPs in this cluster. Finally, instead of us-
ing an exact optimization method, heuristic approaches [20]
could be used to approximate the optimal solution of the op-
timization problem and improve computation efficiency. We
intend to further study the efficiency of these approaches in
future work.
5. RELATEDWORK
Stajano et al. [42] were among the first to raise the issue
of kin privacy in genomics, and suggest to discuss questions
such as: Should you be allowed to disclose your genome if
other relatives do not want to? Our work notably aims to
address this concern. Cassa et al. [10] provide a framework
for measuring the interdependent privacy risks between two
siblings. They show that the inference error is substantially
reduced when the sibling’s SNPs are known, compared to
when only the population frequencies are used. Humbert et
al. [27] generalized this evaluation of kin genomic privacy
risks by considering any kind of observation from family
members, LD relationships between SNPs, and well-defined
privacy metrics. We build upon this work to propose pri-
vacy protection mechanisms that meet all family members’
privacy requirements while maximizing utility.
Homer et al. [26] prove that de-identification is an inef-
fective way to protect the privacy of genomic data, which is
also supported by other works [23, 28, 36, 45, 48]. Most re-
cently, Gymrek et al. [25] show how they identified DNAs of
several individuals and families who participated in scientific
studies. Building upon [26], Sankararaman et al. [39] pro-
vide quantitative guidelines for researchers willing to make a
certain number of SNPs publicly available in GWAS, with-
out revealing the presence of a single individual within a
study group. Fienberg et al. [19] propose using differen-
tial privacy to protect the identities of participants in scien-
tific study. In the same vein, Johnson and Shmatikov [30]
propose privacy-preserving algorithms for computing vari-
ous statistics related to the SNPs, while guaranteeing dif-
ferential privacy. However, differential privacy reduces the
accuracy of research results and it is aimed to be applied on
aggregate results. Our work focuses on protecting individual
genomes’ privacy.
Some pieces of work also focus on protecting the privacy
of genomic data and on preserving utility in medical tests
such as (i) searching of a particular pattern in the DNA
sequence [7, 44], (ii) comparing the similarity of DNA se-
quences [6, 8, 13, 14, 29, 34], and (iii) performing statistical
analysis on several DNA sequences [32]. Furthermore, Ay-
day et al. propose privacy-preserving schemes for medi-
cal tests and personalized medicine methods that use pa-
tients’ genomic data [5]. For privacy-preserving clinical ge-
nomics, a group of researchers proposes to outsource some
costly computations to a public cloud or semi-trusted ser-
vice provider [11, 46]. All aforementioned works make use
of cryptographic protocols to protect the privacy of genomic
data. In this paper, we propose a non-cryptographic ap-
proach to protect genomic privacy.
Finally, Calmon and Fawaz propose an inference frame-
work to evaluate privacy risks under utility constraints in
a generic settings [17]. Their goal is to minimize infor-
mation leakage subject to certain utility constraints. They
show that their optimization problem can be cast as a modi-
fied rate-distortion problem. They eventually compare their
framework with differential privacy.
6. DISCUSSION
There is little doubt that the momentum in genome se-
quencing will bring new challenges to data security and pri-
vacy. In this work, we convey the importance of building
mechanisms for preserving genomic privacy. Such privacy
goes beyond the protection of genome information of the
individual to consider the interests of family members. Rel-
atives might be unwilling to allow predictions of their SNPs
based on leakage of information from one or several indi-
viduals of the kin. The approach presented here searches
for balance between accuracy (utility) of genomic data and
privacy by relying on graphical models and optimization.
Our solution has also some limitations. The approach
requires input that could be difficult to obtain in practice.
However, default privacy preferences could be set by the sys-
tem (e.g., considering the SNPs revealing privacy-sensitive
diseases), letting individuals provide personal input about
their privacy sensitivities if they wish. Another possible ap-
proach is to let genetic counselors help relatives in their en-
deavors by proposing different genomic-privacy profiles. For
example, some profiles could be more or less restrictive in
general terms, or forbid access to information related to spe-
cific diseases (e.g., Mendelian diseases, or predispositions to
dementia). The details are out of the scope of this work.
We do not claim to solve the whole genomic-privacy prob-
lem and to thwart all possible attacks. Our solution protects
against the best known attribute-inference attack, given the
current data model. Following [27], we did not make use of
genetic imputation via IBD as we do not assume the hap-
lotypes to be accessible to the adversary.13 Availability of
this information or phenotypes could further improve the
inference attack, but we leave its evaluation for future work.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A. SAMPLE ATTACK ON KIN
GENOMIC PRIVACY
In this section, we give a concrete example of the threat
discussed in Section 2.2 by using publicly available data on
the Internet. We gathered individuals’ genomic data from
OpenSNP.org, a website on which people can publicly share
sets of SNPs. Then, we identified the owners of 149 Open-
SNP profiles. By relying on publicly accessible resources
(e.g., genealogical websites), we could collect the family tree
of 47 of these identified individuals. We also merged family
trees with common ancestors to reconstruct hidden family
relationships. We noticed that three of the identified indi-
viduals were associated to the same family (which is here-
after referred to as the targeted family). Furthermore, from
the family tree, we obtained the names of 3 target individu-
als (only considering ancestors up to the grandparents of
youngest identified individual revealing his SNPs) in the
same family, as shown in Fig. 8(a). We emphasize again
that these 3 target individuals did not publicly share any
genomic data and that they would possibly be against such
a disclosure. We compute the health privacy of the three
targets closest to the observed individuals, about their pre-
dispositions to Alzheimer’s disease.14
We used the metrics in (4) to quantify the health pri-
vacy of the target individuals.15 We assigned equal weights
to both associated SNPs (as their combination determines
the predisposition to Alzheimer’s disease). In Fig. 8(b), we
show the attacker’s uncertainty about the predisposition to
Alzheimer’s disease for the target individuals. We notice
a decrease of 40% for the father, and of 60% for both the
grandmother and the grandfather, compared to their initial
privacy, without any information about the genomes of their
relatives.
14Two particular SNPs (rs7412 and rs429358) on the
Apolipoprotein E (ApoE) gene indicate an (increased) risk
for Alzheimer’s disease.
15We used the (normalized) entropy in (2) on the targeted
SNPs for Gik in (4).
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Figure 8: Sample attack showing the threat on ge-
nomic and health privacy. (a) The family tree of the
target family, in which the “check” means that the
genome of the family member is publicly available
in OpenSNP, and “cross” means it is not. (b) The
decrease in health privacy of family members (fo-
cusing on the Alzheimer’s disease), whose genomes
are not publicly available.
Appendix B. THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL
KNAPSACK PROBLEM
The knapsack problem is one the most well-known prob-
lems in combinatorial optimization [33]. Given a set of
items, each with a weight and a value, the goal is to de-
termine the optimal set of items so that the total weight
in the sack is less than or equal to a given limit and the
total value is maximized. The 0-1 knapsack problem can
be formulated as an optimization problem with, for item i,
decision variable xi ∈ {0, 1}, weight wi, and value vi. The
optimization problem is NP-hard. However, dynamic pro-
gramming and branch and bound methods can solve this
problem in pseudo-polynomial time. The multidimensional
0-1 knapsack problem is a generalization of the 0-1 knapsack
problem, and can be formulated as
maximize
x
N∑
i=1
vixi
subject to
N∑
i=1
wi,jxi ≤ cj ,∀j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}
xi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
(18)
where x is the decision vector embedding all N decision vari-
ables, wi,j is the weight of decision variable xi for the jth
constraint, cj is the capacity of constraint j, M is the num-
ber of constraints, and N is the number of decision variables.
Note that M = 1 leads to the original 0-1 knapsack prob-
lem (with a single constraint). Solving the multidimensional
knapsack problem (MKP) is NP-hard and it remains a chal-
lenge, especially when the number of constraints increases.
For any fixed M ≥ 2, the MKP admits no fully polynomial-
time approximation scheme unless P = NP. There are two
types of approaches for solving this problem: exact meth-
ods and heuristics [20]. Dynamic programming has been
initially proposed for solving the MKP [22, 47]. However,
due to its excessive memory space requirements, only prob-
lems with small values of N and capacities cj can be solved
with dynamic programming. Exact solutions can be com-
puted more efficiently by relying on branch and bound meth-
ods [21, 24, 41]. Shih [41] makes use of linear relaxations
to estimate an upperbound of the optimal value, whereas
Glover [24], and Gavish and Pirkul rely on surrogate re-
laxations [21]. Shih reports experiments with 5 constraints
and 30-90 variables, whereas Gavish and Pirkul tested their
algorithm with sizes up to 80 variables and 7 constraints.
Heuristic approaches can also be competitive alternatives to
exact methods, particularly when the number of constraints
is large. These heuristics can be grouped into greedy algo-
rithms, mathematical programming approaches and meta-
heuristics (that notably include genetic algorithms). More
details about heuristic methods can be read in Section 4
of [20].
